In this paper I tackle the question of what basic form an analytical method for articulating and ultimately assessing visual representations should take. I start from the assumption that scientific images, being less prone to interpretive complication than artworks, are ideal objects from which to engage this question. I then assess a recent application of Nelson Goodman's aesthetics to the project of parsing scientific images, Laura 
Introduction
The study of visual reasoning requires an analysis of visual content. While one might suppose that the visual arts are the most obvious place to begin any investigation into visual reasoning, the complications of artistic style and expression threaten to obscure the basic features of visual form and information to which any general analysis must be expected to attend. In contrast, images in science 2 are objects that aim to convey information while avoiding subjective, expressive or otherwise inappropriately persuasive effects and as such stand as ideal visual examples from which to develop a generic account of visual content and reasoning. It is, after all, uncontroversial that a central function of scientific images is to facilitate reasoning.
Many theorists writing about images in science emphasize their ubiquity in scientific communication, education and practice (see, for instance, Elkins 1995; Kaiser 2005; Kemp 2000; Sargent 1996; Ruse 1996, 269) . Less common is the development of a robust analytic method for discerning the content of these images, seamlessly integrated into a general scientific epistemology that explains how scientists reason with images. This lacuna is paradoxical, especially among those trained in the Anglo-American tradition who are typically impressed by the power of good analysis. There is prima facie reason to expect that just as an analytical method that goes beyond surface grammar to logical structure is a 2 To my knowledge, there is no term that refers uncontroversially to the generic objects of interest in this paper, which are, roughly speaking, rendered (as opposed to mental) visual content bearers. Perini typically uses the term 'visual representation' (though this has Goodmanian baggage) and I mostly use 'image' as a generic term for this type of object.
invaluable tool for clarifying linguistic content and reasoning with sentences, so an analytical method that goes beyond the surface image, laying bare the machinery of pictorial representation, would be a powerful tool for clarifying pictorial content and reasoning with images. Arguably, an analytical method for parsing pictorial content is crucial for building a general epistemology of images in science that has robust norms for good image construction, which could ultimately provide a basis from which to develop general accounts of visual reasoning.
Perhaps the dearth of analytic approaches to visual content rests on a tacit agreement within Anglo-American aesthetics that the problem of devising such a theory has been for some time effectively solved. Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art (1968) offers an account of representation and an analysis of visual content that has widely been taken to either fulfill the job of the analysis of visual content, or show that the entire programme is sufficiently fraught to justify its rejection. Goodman's theory is explicitly epistemic, so there is reason to expect his account to provide an analysis of visual content that applies neatly to scientific images and elucidates visual reasoning generally. My primary goal in what follows is to suggest that this is not the case; a general Goodmanian approach to scientific image analysis is unlikely to succeed. My method is to focus on what appears to be one of the most careful and thorough attempts to date to put Goodman's analytic system to work to this end, Laura
Perini's "The Truth in Pictures" (2005) . Here Perini explicates and applies Goodman's analytical tools for the purpose of carefully analyzing and assessing the content of images as they appear on the page (hereafter read to include other rendering surfaces-e.g. blackboards, posters, computer screens, etc.). Starting from the claim that the epistemic efficacy of scientific images depends on their having the capacity to be true, Perini utilizes Goodman's account of the interpretive conventions for symbol systems (1968) as an analytical method for demarcating types of visual representation and parsing their content. Perini's analysis is not only interesting because of her dependence on Goodman's theory of representation but also for her attempt to engage the subject at this general and foundational level. Arguably, Perini makes the best case possible for the rigorous application of Goodmanian conventionalism to this analytical task. Thus, insofar as her project fails to provide an adequate method of analysis, it speaks, if not decisively then persuasively, against the promise of a Goodmanian conventionalism as an approach to understanding the content of visual representations. system that can be parsed and assessed. An electron micrograph (Figure 3 ), in contrast, is treated as a worrying but marginal case; though it requires special accommodation that effectively speaks against the Perini-Goodman theory, this is not taken as sufficiently significant to warrant the theory's rejection. I argue that, far from marginal, the electron micrograph is a type of representation that both is paradigmatically pictorial and plays a crucial epistemic role in science. The manner of the micrograph's mechanical production allows it to be used as evidence and as a means for discovery and also makes it unlikely that a conventionalist system of analysis will be able to usefully parse it. Ultimately, I suggest that John Willats (1997) provides analytical tools that can both identify pictures as a type of visual representation and characterize their form and content, elucidating pictures like the electron micrograph in a way that is more psychologically plausible and retains the important and useful features of Goodman's conventionalism. As such, Willats' account promises a more viable groundwork for parsing the content of an important subset of scientific images and explaining their roles in reasoning processes. While it might be argued that the PeriniGoodman system successfully offers a method for analyzing the content of types of images that I will call 'visual languages,' pictorial content is better elucidated by a Willats-style analysis. 3 Perini has, however, offered a new benchmark in terms of analytic rigor and depth, redefining what should be expected from a general analysis of and epistemology for scientific images. Moreover, she has directed the discussion of the role of images in scientific reasoning to the question of content as a kind of first issue that must be decided before a complete account can be devised.
Preliminary Considerations: Epistemic Function, Truth and Language
There can be little doubt that Goodman's aesthetics has had a central role in the development of aesthetics in Anglo-American philosophy (see Giovannelli 2009 and Elgin 1997) . One of the attractions of Goodman's theory for those concerned with rigorous analysis is that it reduces pictorial representations to denoting quasi-linguistic symbol systems and thus retains something of the familiar structure of propositional logic and truth-functionality.
For Goodman, images, like sentences in natural or formal languages, are symbols that belong to a symbol system and schema with rules of reference and that denote (or fail to denote) states of affairs. This raises the question of whether truth-bearing capacity is actually required for pictures to be epistemically efficacious. Certainly, in traditional propositional attitude 3 In her paper in this volume, "Diagrams in Biology," Perini addresses a particular type of visual representation, the diagram, that is peculiarly well-suited to a Goodmanian analysis (Perini 2010, p# (ms 5) and by so doing adds considerably to an explication of visual languages. Each of her five examples, however, could also be parsed using Willats' approach and I am inclined to think that in the places where the spatial relations of the rendered image conform more or less directly with the spatial relations of the state of a affairs depicted, Willats' analysis would be both more detailed and more illuminating. Perhaps a mixed approach, treating the diagrams both as Goodmanian visual languages and as Willats-style pictures, would be more useful than either one alone. I invite my readers to consider the question for themselves, as a proper argument to this effect would take me beyond the scope of this paper. There is, however, no need to adopt this account of scientific justification and, indeed, one might think that the semantic approach, which treats theories either as models or as being in some sense instantiated in or interpreted through models, is currently a preferred candidate for an epistemology of scientific images. After all, some scientific images appear to be models, at least on some accounts (consider a chemical diagram of a benzene ring), and others accompany models; thus they may be expected to be epistemically related to models.
4 By 'traditional propositional attitude epistemology' I refer to the type of approach that has dominated 20th century Anglo-American philosophy, which analyses knowledge by specifying conditions under which an epistemic subject, S, can be said to have knowledge of a certain proposition, p. Paradigmatically, it is suggested that S knows that p if and only if S believes that p, p is true and S is justified in believing that p. Gettier (1963) , both clearly articulated this approach and showed why it must be wrong, but the many responses to his argument have typically taken the form of additions or corrections to the concept of justification, rather than addressing the assumption that knowledge (and indeed belief) is an attitude of acceptance as true that S takes towards a proposition and that a knowable proposition must be capable of being true.
Whether as mediators between theory and world (Cartwright 1999; Morrison and Morgan 1999) or as constitutive of theories (Giere 1988, 82-6) , models are not the kinds of things that are thought to be true, understood on a traditional conception, where truth is a property of propositions. Other notions of epistemic success-such as fitting out (Cartwright 1999) , similarity in relevant respects and to a sufficient degree (Giere 1988, 81) , conformation (Longino 2002, 115) or even 'true enough' (which is defined to include felicitous falsehoods) (Elgin 2004 )-are prevalent in semantic approaches to theory. Thus finding a role for images in reasoning need not rest on parsing their content so as to fit inferential systems designed for linguistic representations. Once we recognize that truth-bearing capacity may not be required for epistemic significance, a Goodmanian quasi-linguistic analytic method may look less appealing.
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Despite clearly stating that assigning meaning to a particular visual representation should not depend on its being mediated by some other representation, i.e., being translated into a linguistic representation (274-5), Perini's primary approach to such assessments depends on translation into language, albeit a metalanguage. She explains, "To define truth for a symbol system you need a systematic way to (1) name each representation in the system and then (2) state the fact the symbol represents" (276). She continues:
A statement of the definition of truth for a visual system requires a way to assign a linguistic name to each symbol based on its structural form, and also a linguistic [or metalinguistic] expression of the content of each representation. A definition of truth for a visual symbol system consists of a statement of this form for every figure f in a system. Name (f) is true IFF statement(f). (276, emphasis hers) 5 Although I do not argue for it in the current paper, I do think that the appropriate epistemic success terms for images that can be parsed through a Willats-style analysis is something like, 'conformation,' 'fitting out,' 'true enough,' and 'similarity in relevant respects and to a sufficient degree.' We might also want to follow Goodman in focusing on understanding as the central epistemological concept rather than knowledge (Giovannelli 2009, §4.6 ).
Thus for Perini analysis rests on the capacity to name the image, identify its characters and translate it into something linguistic.
However, Perini explains that this approach is just "a method used to demonstrate that a system exhibits an appropriately systematic relationship between the form of its symbols and the states of affairs they refer to because such a systematic relationship determines truth conditions for symbols of a system" (280 representations themselves, I focus on the syntactic. As I am particularly interested in Perini's application of Goodman's system, I quote her explanation of it:
In syntactically disjoint systems each mark is assigned to at most one character. English is syntactically disjoint because any of the marks that appear in a particular word are instances of exactly one letter of the alphabet. There might be an infinite number of characters (e.g., the standard symbols for fractions) but each mark is an instance of only one. Syntactically nondisjoint systems contain some marks that are instantiations of more than one character….In such a system, the character assignment of at least some marks will be either undecidable or context dependent.
Another way to categorize symbol systems is by distinguishing between those whose characters are all differentiable from one another and those with characters that are undistinguishable in principle. A system is syntactically articulate when any mark that does not belong to two characters can be determined not to be an instance of either one or the other. Written English is a syntactically articulate system; markings for each letter of the alphabet can be determined not to be instances of other letters. But many visual representations are not syntactically articulate. For example [and this is a warning of things to come], the identity of the electron micrograph is determined by the exact array of black and white, including gradation in tone…Limitations on measurement make it impossible to determine the form of this character with complete precision. As a result, the exact identity of the figure as a unique character cannot be determined.
Systems with infinitely many characters are syntactically dense if the characters are ordered such that for any two characters there is another ordered between them….
Goodman calls systems that are syntactically disjoint and articulate linguistic systems….
….
[These] can be contrasted with systems which are syntactically inarticulate and dense. I will refer to such systems as pictorial systems, since this category includes the kinds of images we think of as pictures (photographs, perspective drawings, courtroom sketches, etc.). The difference between pictorial representation and representation with articulate and discrete syntax is exemplified in the contrast between the sweeping second hand of an analog clock and the discrete integers of a digital clock. While Perini's account is fairly straightforward, a few features are particularly noteworthy. First, the conventionalism of this approach is evident at the most basic level of image analysis; marks represent by virtue of being characters in a symbol system. Secondly, the very features that determine that a representation is pictorial-syntactic inarticulateness and density-are precisely those that we can expect to cause problems for translation into language as by definition they indicate that characters in the symbol system cannot be exactly determined. Finally, this approach produces a counterintuitive classification of types of visual representation. Even if the class of visual pictures includes many of "the kinds of images we think of as pictures," it excludes a good many others and, moreover, includes some images that are not intuitively pictorial (273). Strangely, some graphs count as pictorial representations because their axes are dense (e.g., Figure 1 ), whereas other graphs (for instance bar charts scoping over relatively small numbers of discrete, countable objects), by virtue of being syntactically articulate, are expressions in a visual language. Chemical diagrams are also visual languages, despite intuitively seeming pictorial, at least in comparison to most graphs. 8 Of course, intuitions can be misleading and, arguably, the point of an analytic method is to provide something more robust than intuitions to guide one's understanding and assessment of represented content. Nonetheless, if an equally rigorous or elucidating analytic method is available, which better conforms to our intuitions, the counterintuitive aspects of the Goodman-Perini analysis speak against it.
3.c. Amendment to Goodman-Convention and Resemblance
It is perhaps a concern about intuitive plausibility that inspires Perini to make a role for resemblance relations in visual representation. This is a major departure from Goodman's strict conventionalism, which denies any role for resemblance in realistic or naturalistic representation: "Realistic representation," writes Goodman, "depends not upon imitation or illusion or information but upon inculcation" (1968, 38) . Although Perini is by no means in a minority in rejecting this view (see Arrell 1987, 41) , her amendments appear ad hoc; and through attempting to avoid the prima facie implausibility of Goodman's conventionalism,
she not merely remains vulnerable to some of the serious challenges to conventionalism, but also to some of the serious challenges from Goodman's conventionalism. While intuitively it seems resemblance must have some role in at least some visual representations, Perini fails to appreciate how the psychology of perception and Goodman's canny criticisms constrain what that role might be.
Perini follows Craig Files ' (1996) suggestion that although Goodman is right that convention, not resemblance, entirely determines which objects are representations, he is wrong when it comes to his claim that convention alone determines content. It is difficult to see how any conventionalism of this type can survive the challenge from the capacity of many non-human animals to glean pictorial content. This capacity is so widely accepted that countless psychological experiments simply assume it (e.g., Perrett et al. 1992 ). To suggest that non-human animals-for instance, macaques or pigeons-are following pictorial conventions and deciphering symbol systems makes nonsense out of the term 'convention.' Furthermore, to suggest that there is a psychological, non-conventional explanation for non-human animals' capacities to glean pictorial content and a conventional explanation for these capacities in humans is ad hoc and suspect in light of evolutionary continuity. Certainly, most humans, unlike most other animals, 10 can also make use of conventions in the creation and perception of visual content (as is clear from the many visual representations that are rich with symbolism or that combine image and text). However, the capacity of nonhuman animals to see content in pictures suggests, prima facie, that the visual experience of pictures is in some sense akin to the visual experience of the objects they depict.
11 9 Goodman scholars may wonder why Perini does not invoke his idea of exemplification, which depends on properties that a representation shares with its subject (albeit possibly metaphorically). While I have no good answer to give, the spatial properties of scenes, which Willats' account of projection systems so nicely elucidates, seem to defy neat analysis as a form of exemplification.
10 I say 'most' to acknowledge the use of visual symbols to communicate by some of the language apes, for instance, Kanzi.
11 Notice, however, that similarity of visual experience entails nothing about any specific resemblance relations between the representation and the represented object. Indeed, it is the point of Ames illusions (and pictures thereof) that similarities of visual experience can often obtain where none but the vaguest resemblance relations exist between visual representation and represented object.
Nonetheless, naïve resemblance theories are also fraught with problems, as
Goodman's criticisms demonstrate. Files' discussion is directed toward one part of Goodman's argument-the claim that representation cannot be based on resemblance as resemblance is a symmetrical relation whereas representation is not (1996, 398) . But
Goodman also attacks resemblance itself-the idea that there exists 'the way a thing is' or 'the way a thing looks' that can be copied and captured in a static visual representation. There are, after all, multiple ways any given thing is. As Goodman explains, "…the object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a fiddler, a friend, a fool, and much more.
If none of these constitute the object as it is, what else might? If all are ways the object is, then none is the way the object is" (6). The idea that visual representation concerns copying an aspect of an object or its appearance is little better. Botanical drawings, Perini's example of pictures that resemble their objects, are a case in point. These drawings typically picture the plant as it is never seen-against a plain, monochromatic background, outside its ecological niche and without shade, disease or infestation. Frequently, depending on whether the plant was drawn from a live specimen or a pressed one, the orientation of the leaves and flowers in the image do not resemble those typical of living members of the species in their various natural settings.
Goodman also attacks those representational methods that supposedly produce resemblances because they replicate the exact array of light that would hit the viewer's retina in the state of affairs represented-scientific perspective and photographs (10-19). Such pictures are often taken to be exemplars of accurate representation; but, as Goodman notes, it is only if the eye is precisely placed, motionless and in perfect lighting conditions that they do actually replicate this array of light. Such conditions are "grossly abnormal" (13).
Moreover, recreating the array of light produced by a state of affairs seen from a particular point in space and time is far from recreating the experience of that state of affairs from that Peak dwindles dismally in a snapshot. As the saying goes, there is nothing like a camera to make a molehill out of a mountain" (15).
Certainly, Goodman's criticisms of naïve resemblance theories, particularly those that privilege perspective or reporting to picture things as they are or appear, are persuasive; but replacing them with a thoroughgoing conventionalism seems an unpalatable alternative. Not merely is such conventionalism counterintuitive (even to advocates of Goodman's theory like Perini), but it is also unable to account for the cross-species psychology of pictorial perception. We need something in between-an account that shows how visual form is significant, relating it to visual experience and the interested eye. This account should be psychologically plausible and avoid Goodman's criticisms while also providing a method for parsing pictures-a means of analyzing visual form to determine represented content. Such an account has been developed by John Willats.
Willats' Alternative Analytical Tools
In There are three basic types of projection system: orthogonal, oblique and perspective.
Although the reader is doubtlessly familiar with perspective, I quote Willats' brief overview as it introduces useful technical terms (specifically, the 'picture plane' and 'orthogonals'):
In pictures in perspective…objects that are further away in the scene are shown to a smaller scale than objects that are closer to the viewer, and the lines representing 13 edges that lie perpendicular to the picture plane, or orthogonals as they are called, converge to a vanishing point…. ( Willats 1997, 2) The picture plane is understood as an imaginary plane located between the scene and the viewer, intersected by projection lines or rays coming from the objects pictured in the scene (Figures 4 and 5 illustrate picture planes). "The geometry of these intersections forms the geometry of the picture" (37). Interestingly, perspective effects are not exhausted by geometry. Other ways of creating the appearance of distance-diminishing clarity of form, diminishing tonal contrast, diminishing colour saturation, and blurring distant objects (141-3)-are familiar devices in perspective painting, but entirely distinct from the formal geometrical properties dictated by the projection system and so are kept clearly separated from the projection system level of analysis.
While perspective is more familiar (arguably through inculcation), oblique and orthogonal projection 14 are equally legitimate and are far better suited to representing certain spatial features of a scene accurately.
In pictures in oblique projection…objects are shown to the same scale irrespective of their distance from the viewer, and the orthogonals are parallel and run at an oblique angle across the picture surface [see Figure 4 ]….In pictures in orthogonal projection…objects are shown to the same scale irrespective of distance, but there are no orthogonals. Instead, edges in the scene that lie perpendicular to the picture plane…are represented by points; and planes that are perpendicular to the picture plane…are represented by single lines [see Figure 5 ]. (2-4)
Traditional East Asian and medieval European art provide some of the more familiar examples of oblique projection, but technical drawings also sometimes make use of this system as it gives a suggestion of depth while retaining true relative sizes and true shapes of objects parallel to the picture plane. As oblique projection can also produce ambiguities, typically technical drawing is done using orthogonal projection, which shows to scale all true relative sizes and shapes of features parallel to the picture plane, but (confusingly) has no orthogonals. In technical drawings that use orthogonal projection, additional relevant shape information that is not visible from the view is shown through dashed ('hidden') lines and/or through one or more alternate views, where the pictured object is rotated at 90 degrees to the main view. Each of these projection systems map spatial relations in a state of affairs into corresponding relations on the page; within each system visual form is significant but in different ways.
Psychological facts about human perception further complicate matters, bringing to the fore Goodman's insight that none of these projection systems create resemblances in any straightforward way. Perceptual constancies, such as shape constancy, "the tendency to see an object as its true shape regardless of the viewing angle" and size constancy, "the tendency to see an object as its true size regardless of the viewing distance" (Willats 1997, 40) inform not only the perception of objects, but also the perception of pictures. Such constancies explain the diminishing of Pike's Peak and why one's feet may appear unnaturally enlarged in an unflattering snapshot. Furthermore, just as in experience we may have difficulty recognizing objects when we see them in certain unfamiliar positions, so in various different orientations to the picture plane, represented objects will be more or less easily recognized (Willats 1997, 79-84) . Though ordinary visual experiences are determined by the interested eye and the world, the construction of the appearances of objects in pictures is often the result of a combined effort of the viewer's interested eye and past experience and the artist's practiced hand.
Of course, projection systems form only one main branch of Willats' analytical method. Indeed, it is not even the most general level of spatial analysis as many pictures make no use of a formal projection system but still spatially represent spatial relations in the world. Thus, for instance, subway maps represent the spatial order of stations and the intersections of routes, but not true relative lengths and shapes. These basic spatial, or topological, relations are, interestingly, the first to be mastered in children's development, when a child learns to draw a face with the eyes above the mouth and all facial features inside the region representing the head (Willats 1997, 13-15, 70-5) .
Because denotation systems concern the visual features of the marks that constitute the image they provide the most basic level of analysis, starting with the mark-the pigment on the page. These scene primitives then represent objects (93-108).
To facilitate understanding of the above terminology, I provide an example in Figure   6 . It is natural to name and describe what are in fact marks on a page as two cubes; Willats'
analysis reveals how marks create the picture of the cubes. Interestingly, the cubes can be seen as being in two separate scenes or as in one scene. If they are in one scene, the cube on the right appears to be closer to us than the cube on the left because we tacitly infer from their orientations that they are resting on a single surface. However, the difference between the projection and denotation systems used to represent each cube fight against seeing them as together in this way. The projection system for the cube on the left is oblique 17 and that on the right is perspective. 18 At the most basic level of the denotation system-the domain of marks-the cubes are rendered using the same materials, some kind of ink (or, if you are reading an electronic copy of the paper, pixels). The most obvious difference between the two cubes lies in their picture primitives. The cube on the left is constructed from 2D 16 Goodman actually defines mark more broadly and arguably takes the character to be the object of the most basic level of analysis. He writes, "Characters are certain classes or utterances or inscriptions or marks. (I shall use 'inscription' to include utterances, and 'mark' to include inscriptions; an inscription is any markvisual auditory, etc.-that belongs to a character" (Goodman 1968, 131) . 17 Here, the object is drawn in cavalier oblique projection-the front of the object is shown as its true shape and the lines creating the back and side of the object are their true lengths. In other words, they are not foreshortened, as they would be in a perspective drawing (Willats 1997, 46-55) .
regions, some of which are primarily extended in one direction and others that are equally extended in both dimensions, while that on the right has only points as picture primitives, which form another type of picture primitive, lines. The scene primitives appear to be the same in both images and it is by virtue of this that they construct the same type of object. The left hand image has edges, represented by regions extended in one dimension, and surfaces, between visual languages and visual pictures, discussed above), Willats' system provides a way of demarcating the pictorial from the nonpictorial that matches our intuitions. A picture is simply that which is amenable to all levels of his analysis-something that represents the spatial information from a state of affairs on a two dimensional surface.
The Three Examples
We are now ready to test these two analytical methods against Perini's examples. As we shall see, neither system can completely and satisfactorily parse all three examples;
Willats' approach stalls on the graph (Figure 1 ), Perini's stalls on the electron micrograph ( Figure 3) . However, whereas the limits of Willats' analysis suggest that the graph is not pictorial, the failings of Perini's theory speak against her account, at least insofar as it is supposed to explain the truth in pictures. By her own lights, the electron micrograph is the most clearly pictorial example, but the least amenable to her Goodmanian analysis.
Interestingly, her account of visual language survives these problems and might be considered a friendly addition to Willats' approach, though an in depth account of this joint method will have to wait until a later time.
5.a. Perini's Analysis
Perini's least problematic example, the chemical diagram (Figure 2) , is syntactically disjoint and articulate and is thus part of a visual language. The figure can be decomposed into atoms and the meaning of the figure is easily determined by the arrangement of these atoms because they and their rules of combination are stipulated. 19 In Perini's words, "The interpretative convention used to understand the figure determines a particular state of affairs, which can be expressed linguistically….The concept of truth for such systems can be specified because every representation in the system can be given both a name and a statement of the fact that makes it true, both expressed as a recursive function of the arrangement of atomic characters" (277-8).
Things are a bit trickier when we look at the graph (Figure 1 ). It is pictorial on Perini's account as it lacks a completely articulate syntax because the values in the axes are dense (between any two characters there is another ordered between them) and thus cannot be decomposed into atoms and translated. But Perini claims we can still get a robust concept of truth for the system. We can identify some atomic characters-the axes, terms for values, the (278). It appears that the graph, despite being syntactically dense, has a truth value because we can articulate the truth conditions for particular points on the curve, due to the significant form of the graph being translatable into mathematical expressions.
This explanation draws attention to some troubling aspects of Perini's theory.
Pictorial representations are defined as failing to be syntactically articulate, but capacity to bear truth exactly rests on being able to precisely decipher the content of a representation because it is syntactically articulate. It seems that what makes a visual representation pictorial undermines its capacity to bear truth! The graph is only able to straddle this apparent contradiction by being dense as a whole, but allowing articulate content to be drawn from it sentence by sentence, precisely determined by the relevant interpretive conventions.
Employing the categories defined above, despite being a visual picture (as it is impossible to assign some marks particular characters), we can treat it as a visual language. At this point it appears that rather than showing "The Truth In Pictures," Perini has given us an account of the truth in visual languages.
This brings us to the last image, the electron micrograph (Figure 3 ), which is pictorial in both Perini's technical sense and intuitively and seems to defy Goodman-Perini-style analysis. Initially, Perini suggests naming the figure by specifying it pixel by pixel (279), but neither this norm any other approach seems able to unambiguously translate the relevant content of the picture, which, according to Perini, "depends on our visual perception of shapes" (280). There are no atomic characters thus the relation between symbol form and content cannot be precisely specified. At this point Perini opens the backdoor, mentioned above, and reminds us that all we really need is "an appropriately systematic relationship between the form of [a symbol system's] symbols and the states of affairs they refer to" (280). In the case of the electron micrograph, she suggests this systematic relationship is produced by the process of creating it. Electrons are beamed through a thin sample of biological material surrounded by an electron deflecting stain. The light areas of the micrograph correspond "geometrically" (281) initially, to impose interpretive conventions onto images of newly discovered objects but they will later be rejected if they prove empirically inadequate and thus they cannot alone be constitutive of the content and the 'truth' of the picture.) While conventions that explicitly stipulate characters and syntax may over time come to play an important role for viewing these same kinds of pictures, unless represented content is at least initially determined by something more than convention it is difficult to see how an evidential role for machineproduced pictures can get off the ground.
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But there are more serious problems for Perini's view. She suggests that the mechanical production of the electron micrograph produces a systematic relationship by 20 Some philosophers of science who maintain a conventionalist approach to scientific epistemology may dispute my conclusion here. This seems, however, to wed them to a strong form of antirealism in which neither 'truth' nor any other analogous epistemic success terms would apply.
virtue of which the micrograph can be true. We might suppose that mechanical production guarantees a systematic relationship between the appearance of the state of affairs and the representation, but, as noted above, there is no one way any object appears and, moreover, certain mechanical procedures can be plagued by noise or introduce other systematic problems (such as false attachment or other ambiguities concerning apparent depth). We can see from Willats' account that there are many different ways of projecting a 3D state of affairs onto to a 2D surface and many different denotation systems that can have markedly different visual forms and still present the same content. Perini's vague remarks about the micrograph being a "geometrical projection" (281) and being imperfectly correlated with the spatial features of the sample (281) are simply insufficient and, indeed, seem to call for something like Willats' analysis to do the job properly.
Despite her own caveats, Perini argues that her Goodmanian approach is the only way to explain how images like the electron micrograph can have any kind of epistemic significance at all. Because a never before seen micrograph is still comprehensible (as witnessed by the possibility of discovery through pictures), Perini maintains that the relation between symbol and content cannot be arbitrary and thus the micrograph must be part of a symbol system with interpretive conventions that determine meaning. "Unless there was a systematic relation between the form of the symbol and the state of affairs it represents, it seems impossible to explain how such a figure could be understood" (281 
5.b. Willats' Analysis
Willats' alternative analytical method is able to engage Perini's examples at the points where her analysis is most paradoxical. Consider the electron micrograph. Willats' tools reveal how the relation between its form and its content is non-arbitrary and comprehensible, yet poorly described as a symbol system composed of characters. The systematic relation between representation and object is determined by projecting a three dimensional scene onto a two-dimensional surface-a procedure in this case, achieved mechanically. The 'geometric projection' and the relevance of 'our visual perception of shapes,' to which Perini alludes, decontextualized representation with an untrained eye. Indeed, it is precisely the identity of the objects and an understanding of their relations that the scientists who first view such images attempt to discover. But the image is clearly a scene as it shows shape representations of physical objects-a cell membrane ultrastructure and its parts-that have more complex attributes than their shapes. Again, Willats' analytical tools offer a means for assessing the image in terms of whether the features of the marks produce picture primitives that obscure or reveal the important shape information for identifying and characterizing the objects pictured. The mechanical process determines the form of the image and the form determines the content. Also the counterfactual dependence of image on object entailed by its mechanical production provides a kind of epistemic access to the object that justifies accepting that the spatial relations that constitute the parts of the object and their relations are as they appear in the image.
As for the chemical diagram the marks are again ink on the page. But in this case the picture primitives are all lines, some dashed, many inscribing regions. The scene primitives are trickier as it is not clear whether we are meant to see these shapes as two-dimensional or three-dimensional. However, this is irrelevant to identifying the objects represented. In this case, object identification appears to be straightforward as the significance of shapes of the objects is stipulated. Here the notion of a visual language is useful as each part of the representation denotes a particular object or relation and in order to understand its precise content each part must be translated and read. There are, however, reasons to think that it is also a visual picture, though a complete account would require additional conceptual tools.
Although there is no projection system, very rudimentary topological relations are preserved; the extended regions can be understood as molecules interacting and changing over time.
This may reasonably be understood as a kind of scene (or, perhaps, a set of related scenes). That this demarcation scheme appears to be consistent with our intuitions is only one of a number of strengths of Willats' system. As we have seen, because his approach fundamentally relates pictures to visual features of states of affairs it avoids a number of the problems arising from Goodman-Perini conventionalism. No characters need be identified; nothing need be translated because pictorial representation is entirely autonomous from language, grounded in the psychology of perception. Moreover, the analytical methods for parsing pictorial content themselves suggest norms for assessment. In contrast, the many problems that plague Perini's approach suggest that a Goodmanian conventionalism may be a dead end for a general epistemology of scientific images. Even some of Perini's own remarks relating the electron micrograph to 'our visual perception of shapes' and observing 'geometrical' correspondence seem more appropriate for Willats' system than her own, thus lending it tacit support. It would be a mistake, however, to move too fast as the GoodmanPerini approach still shows promise for the type of images that I have called visual languages, which suggest that there may still be a role for Goodmanian conventionalism in an epistemology of scientific images after all, albeit a limited one.
Drawing Conclusions
Certainly, Perini is engaged in a very important project-devising a general method for analyzing the content of scientific images so as to elucidate their role in scientific reasoning-and she makes an interesting case for a Goodmanian conventionalism. However, the problems with her account suggest that even if it can tell us something about visual languages, it cannot be an appropriate basis for an epistemology of pictures. Fortunately, Willats offers a very powerful analytical method that can serve as a basis for constructing a better theory. The strength of Willats' method is grounded on his sensitivity to the practices of image production and the psychology of perception. He focuses attention not simply on the objects depicted, but instead on the marks on the page and how they construct content. Thus he reminds us of the many different ways in which content can be pictorially represented and offers tools for us to develop analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of various different rendering methods and styles.
Willats' analytical method is wholly different from that designed for language or from a quasi-linguistic approach. His mode of analysis suggests that the logic of pictures might be quite different from that of words and asking whether a pictorial representation is true may be much like asking whether one's current perceptual experience is true-a kind of category mistake. This pushes us to consider the different epistemic functions that visual representations may serve and encourages us to look to the literature on models and the semantic approach to theories for guidance. The fact is that in order to understand the content of images and elucidate visual reasoning we may need to stop trying to apply analytic methods designed for language to these distinctive content bearers. What we cannot abandon is a careful method for analyzing the content of scientific images. Fred Dubery and John Willats 1983, 15 (figure 8) . See also Willats 1997, 43 (figure 2.3 ). 1983, 30 (figure 33) . See also Willats 1997, 53 (figure 2.14) .
Figure 6. Two cubes drawn so as to illustrate the different systems of analysis discussed by
Willats.
